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Australian banks are widely considered to have fared far better during the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) than their global counterparts, continuing  to  display  solid  earnings,  good 
capitalisation  and  strong  credit  ratings.  Nonetheless,  Australian  banks  experienced 
significant deterioration in the market values of assets. We use the KMV/Merton structural 
methodology, which incorporates market asset values, to examine default probabilities of 
Australian  banks.  We  also  modify  the  model  to  incorporate  conditional  probability  of 
default  which  measures  extreme  credit  risk.  We  find t h a t ,  d u r i n g  t h e  G F C ,  b a s e d  o n  
extreme asset value fluctuations, Australian bank default probabilities fare only slightly 
better than their global counterparts. 
. 
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1.  Introduction 
The question addressed by this paper is how the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) impacted on 
the probability of default (PD) of Australian banks, using a methodology which includes 
changes  in  the  market  value  of  assets,  as  opposed  to  static  measures  such  as  external 
ratings. This methodology includes the structural credit model of Merton (1974) and KMV 
(Crosbie  &  Bohn,  2003),  and  our  own  conditional  probability  of default  (CPD)  model 
which measures extreme fluctuations in the market value of assets. The study also considers 
the implications of fluctuating asset values for capital adequacy.  
 
There  is  generally  considered  to  be  strong  evidence t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  r e s i l i e n c e  o f  
Australian  banks  during  the  extreme  conditions  of  the  GFC.  The  5  largest  banks  in 
Australia showed net profit of approximately $8billion over the second half year in 2008. In 
contrast the 5 largest US banks showed losses of nearly $50 billion over the 2008 year, and 
the  5  largest  banks  in  the  UK  reported  losses  of  approximately  £20  billion  before 
extraordinary  items  (Reserve  Bank  of  Australia,  2009c).  The  ratings  of  the  4  major 
Australian  banks  were  raised  from  AA-  to  AA  in  2007 o n  t h e  b a c k  o f  “ p r o g r e s s i v e  
structural strengthening of financial profiles, as  well as continued development of their 
risk-management capabilities”. These ratings were confirmed in July 2009 with Standard & 
Poor’s  (2009a)  citing  a  key  underpinning  reason  for t h i s  b e i n g  a d o p t i o n  o f  a  m o r e  
traditional  retail  and  commercial  model,  with  little  reliance  on  volatile  market  related 
trading income. This was supported by the rater’s expectations of continued satisfactory 
earnings, well controlled credit losses, adequate capitalisation, well-managed funding and 
liquidity, and conservative risk appetite. The above provides an extremely rosy picture of 
Australian banks, which should surely be reflected in bank equity prices and reduced PD 
measures as compared to international experience. However, in reality, Australia is not 
isolated  from  global  markets,  with  uncertainty  leading  to  pressures  on  the  cost  and 
availability of global funding (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2009c). As discussed in Section 
3, there was also a sharp rise in impaired assets and loss provisions of Australian banks, 
albeit at a lower level than their global counterparts. As happened globally, these events 
had a sharply negative effect on share prices and bank asset values. The S&P/ASX200  
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Bank Index, which includes the six largest Australian banks, plunged 58% from a peak in 
October 2007 to a trough in January 2009. In line with global government intervention, the 
Australian government introduced stimulus packages to boost the Australian economy, and 
guarantees  on  deposits  and  wholesale  funding  to  shore  up  confidence  in  the  banking 
industry.  
 
The AA ratings of Australian banks, which remained unchanged (static) during the GFC 
have an associated probability of default (PD) of 0.38% according to Standard and Poor’s 
(2008)  default  matrix.  As  will  be  shown,  this  is  well  below  the  default  probabilities 
indicated by the modelling undertaken by this study over the GFC period. It should be 
noted that rating agents such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s stress that ratings are not 
absolute  measures  of  default,  but  rather  a  relative r a n k i n g  o f  o n e  e n t i t y  t o  a n o t h e r .    
Standard and Poor’s maintain that “Ratings opinions a re  no t i n te n de d  a s  g ua r a n tee s  of  
credit quality or as exact measures of the probability that a particular debt issue will default. 
Instead, ratings express relative opinions about the creditworthiness of an issuer or credit 
quality of an individual debt issue, from strongest to weakest, within a universe of credit 
risk.”  Although  credit  ratings  are  meant  to  be  relative  risk  ratings  and  not  absolute 
measures of default, they are nonetheless used by banks for measuring default probabilities 
and  credit  VaR,  including  of  course  the  credit  risk o f  b o r r o w i n g  b a n k s .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
CreditMetrics, which is the benchmark RiskMetrics credit equivalent for calculating credit 
VaR,  is  based  on  the  transition  and  default  probabilities  provided  by  issuers  such  as 
Standard and Poor’s.    In  addition,  external  credit  ratings  are  used  by  banks  under  the 
standardised Basel approach for allocating capital. If the ratings themselves do not fluctuate 
with market conditions, then neither does the capital allocated. 
 
Contrary  to  these  static  indicators,  the  funding  squeeze,  impaired  asset  increase,  and 
necessity for government intervention do not indicate that credit risk of Australian banks 
remained the same as prior to the financial crisis.  Had global and Australian governments 
not intervened in the market, the situation could potentially  have been  far  worse,  both 
globally and locally.   
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Unlike  static  ratings,  the  Merton/KMV  methodology  does  incorporate  asset  value 
fluctuations. The model is widely used, with Moody’s KMV (2010) reporting use of their 
products by more than 2,000 leading financial institutions in over 80 countries, including 
most of the 100 largest financial institutions in the world. The model measures changes to 
default probabilities based on the distance to default of a firm which is a combination of 
asset values, debt, and the standard deviation of asset value fluctuations, from which PDs 
can be calculated as detailed in Section 5. The point of default is considered to be where 
debt exceeds assets, and the greater the volatility of the assets, the closer the entity moves 
to default. Although, under Basel, capital required for credit risk is a function of the PDs of 
the borrowers of a bank, rather than the PDs of banks themselves, a link can be drawn 
between the PDs of  banks themselves and capital adequacy, as illustrated by the Bank of 
England (BOE, 2008b). BOE report that in 2008 UK banks had equity ratios of around 
3.3%, and assuming volatility in market value of assets of 1.5%, this gives a PD of around 
1%. If volatility doubles, then PD increases substantially to 15%. As bank PDs increase 
with deteriorating market conditions, so too does the chance of the assets needing to be 
liquidated at market prices. Therefore as PDs rose during the GFC, market participants 
changed the way they assessed underlying bank assets, placing a greater weight on mark to 
market asset values, implying lower asset values and higher potential  capital needs for 
banks. Thus BOE sees the mark to market approach of a bank’s assets as providing  a 
measure of how much capital needs to be raised to restore market confidence in the bank’s 
capitalisation. 
 
Other literature on default probabilities includes  an evaluation of static models such as 
accounting models, and an assessment of point in time (PIT) as compared to Through the 
Cycle (TTC) models. Accounting models have been critiqued by Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
as  being  backward  looking  as  opposed  to  the  Merton  model which uses market prices 
reflecting investor expectations of future performance. Vassalou and Xing also make the 
point that accounting models imply that firms with similar financial ratios will have similar 
default probabilities, whereas firms with similar debt and equity levels might have very 
different default probabilities if the volatility of their assets differ. Most of the literature on 
cyclicality of capital requirements (for example, Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, & Tsomocos,  
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2003; Drumond, 2009; Gordy & Howells, 2006; Kashyap & Stein, 2003; L owe, 2002; 
Pederzoli & Toricelli, 2005; Rosch & Scheule, 2010) deals with an investigation into the 
pro-cyclicality of rating approaches and a comparison of the relative benefits of TTC and 
PIT capital adequacy methods. PIT means that banks hold capital based on the current 
rating of a borrower, causing banks to have to increase capital in bad times and reduce it in 
good times. TTC means that banks hold one level of capital  at all times, based on an 
assessment of ‘average’ or ‘median’ risk over a period of time. The TTC approach smooths 
the potential volatility of PD estimates and hence the capital requirements. The European 
Central Bank (ECB, 2009) calls the TTC approach into question, stating that the recent 
financial crisis shows the limits of using TTC ratings. The ECB states that for banks to 
maintain credibility, they need to maintain strong capital during downturns and that during 
these times, even banks using the TTC approach may be forced to raise additional capital to 
align  themselves  with  the  capital  adequacy  of  PIT  based  approaches.  In  summary,  the 
literature uncovers a number of shortfalls with current capital adequacy approaches. Firstly, 
external ratings are only designed to be a measure of relative risk between entities, and 
capital based on this measure will not respond timeously to changes in the business cycle. 
Secondly,  TTC  is  based  on  an  average  or  median  approach.  This  capital  therefore 
corresponds  to  ‘normal’  conditions  which  means  that i n s u f f i c i e n t  c a p i t a l  i s  h e l d  i n  
downturn times when it is most needed, such as during the GFC. Thirdly, PIT ratings mean 
that  banks  have  to  continuously  increase  or  decrease  capital  according  to  changing 
circumstances. None of the methods (external ratings, PIT, TTC) focus on extreme risk, 
meaning that in each case banks could be left scrambling for capital, precisely when it is 
most  difficult  to  obtain  it,  such  as  during  the  GFC w i t h  m a n y  g l o b a l  b a n k s  n e e d i n g  
government bailout to address their capital shortages. Our CPD model, in contrast, does 
focus on extreme risk. Measuring and holding capital based on extreme risk measurements 
has the  downside that  banks  have to  bear  the  cost  of  ‘buffer’  capital  in  upside times. 
However, the key point of capital adequacy is that buffers are available to absorb risk when 
required. The IMF (Caruana & Narain, 2008) maintains that the need for banks to have a 
robust capital regime adequate to the risks they face, including business cycle risk, is borne 
out by the problems banks faced over the GFC, and that “as the experiences of some large 
international banks in the current turmoil have shown, the benefits of being able to access  
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capital  rapidly  in  bad  times  may  outweigh  the  costs o f  h a v i n g  t o  h o l d  c a p i t a l  b u f f e r s  
through  the  cycle”.  Basel  II,  in  fact,  emphasizes  that  volatility  should  be  addressed  in 
capital allocation and that strategic plans should take into account capital needs especially 
in  a  stressful  economic  environment  (Caruana  &  Narain,  2008).  Indeed,  proposed 
amendments to Basel II (i.e. Basel III) include “Introducing a series of measures to promote 
the build-up of capital buffers in good times that can be drawn upon in periods of stress. A 
countercyclical capital framework will contribute to a more stable banking system, which 
will help dampen, instead of amplify, economic and financial shocks” (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2008). 
 
The Merton/KMV model, which does take asset volatilities into account, is primarily used 
to measure default probability (PD) of bank customers. In contrast, (similar to the BOE 
approach  discussed  above,  whereby  increasing  bank  PD’s  are  an  indicator  of  what 
additional  capital  is  required  to  restore  confidence  in  capital  adequacy),  we  use  this 
methodology to measure default risk of the banks themselves, both prior to and during the 
financial crisis. The model however, does not measure extreme risk within each period as it 
is  based  on  the  standard  deviation  of  all  daily asset  returns over a  specific  period.  To 
address this, we have developed a model to measure Conditional Probability of Default 
(CPD), which is based on extreme fluctuations. 
 
Market asset value fluctuations, which form a key component of these methodologies, are 
in turn influenced by share price fluctuations (as the KMV/Merton model methodology in 
Section 5 will show). Therefore, whilst default probability is the primary focus of this 
paper,  it  is  also  important  to  understand  the  banks’  equity  fluctuations,  and  thus 
measurement of this risk forms a supporting secondary focus of this paper. We will use 
Value at Risk (VaR), which is a primary measure of  market risk, together with CVaR 
which measures extreme risk to measure changes in equity market risk prior to and during 
the financial crisis. 
 
It is necessary to take into account that Australian banks have a high reliance on funding 
from international markets, and thus shocks to international markets can impact on bank  
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equity markets while underlying asset risk remains unchanged. Therefore, we use a range 
of other evidence to support the findings of the Merton model. This includes examining the 
changes in bad debts and impaired assets of Australian banks, as well as fluctuations in 
credit default swap (CDS) spreads. As the Merton model typically produces a wider spread 
of default probabilities than KMV, who modify their estimated default frequency (EDF) 
based on observations of actual probabilities from their extensive worldwide database, we 
sensitise the Merton outcomes through calibration to KMV EDF. We also compare the 
relative change in Bank default risk to other Australian industries.  
 
The default modelling techniques used in this study show how the market value of assets 
and  the  capital  of  Australian  banks  have  been  eroded,  substantially  increasing  default 
probabilities.  These  findings  are  supported  by  deterioration  in  other  indicators  such  as 
impaired assets and credit default swap spreads. The importance of using CVaR and CPD is 
that not only is risk measured in the extreme circumstances of the GFC, it is also measured 
at the extreme tail of asset fluctuations, precisely where default is most likely to occur. 
 
Whilst our focus is on Australian banks, in examining the default risk of these banks, we 
will make comparisons with other global banks, specifically US, European and Canadian 
banks.  We  have  selected  US and European  markets  due t o  t h e i r  p r o m i n e n c e  i n  g l o b a l  
banking, and Canadian banks because (as discussed in Section 3) they are considered to 
have had similar experiences to Australian banks during the GFC.  
 
The remaining paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the key contributions 
and  benefits  of  the  study.  Section  3  provides  background  on  the  Australian  banking 
industry.  Section  4  covers  VaR  and  CVaR,  followed  by  a  discussion  about  PD  and 
structural methodology in Section 5.  Data and methodology are discussed in Section 6. 
The  results  are  presented  in  Section  7.  Finally,  Section  8  provides  conclusions  and 
implications. 
 
The  study  does  not  make  representations  about  the  PD  of  individual  banks.  Default 
probabilities calculated using the structural methodology are based on available balance  
7 
sheet and equity price information, and do not take into account external options available 
to banks for reducing PD, such as additional capital raising or government intervention. 
 
2.  Contribution and Benefits of the Study 
The study provides key insights into changes in default risk of Australian banks since the 
onset of the GFC. The study shows how default risk increases dramatically over this period, 
as compared to the default ratings indicated by the external credit ratings. The study can 
benefit regulators and banks by providing insight into the differences in PD estimates using 
models based on asset value fluctuations as compared to external credit ratings. As per the 
discussion by BOE in Section 1, the mark to market approach on bank capital can provide a 
measure  of  what  additional  capital  is  required  to  restore  market  confidence  in  bank 
capitalisation. 
 
In addition, the study incorporates conditional probability of default (CPD) techniques into 
structural models, which is a unique metric developed by the authors designed to measure 
the asset value fluctuations under the most extreme circumstances, which is when default is 
most likely to occur.  
 
3.  The Australian Banking Industry 
As  background  to  our  study  of  Australian  banks,  this  section  examines  the  industry 
structure as well as key growth and risk indicators, with comparisons provided to the US, 
Europe and Canada.  
 
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) regulates all Authorised Deposit 
Taking Institutions (ADI’s).  As per statistics from APRA (2009) and the RBA (2009e), 
ADI’s comprise  58 banks, 11 building societies, and 129 credit unions.  Of the 58 banks, 
13  are  Australian  owned  (comprising  88%  of  total  bank  assets),  the  remainder  are 
subsidiaries  or  branches  of  foreign  banks  (comprising  12%  of  total  bank  assets).  The 
industry is dominated by  the four major banks, which comprise approximately 75% of  
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ADI’s total assets. These banks include Westpac, the Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Corporation (ANZ), the National Australia Bank (NAB), and the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (CBA). These figures include the assets of St. George Bank and the Bank of 
Western  Australia  (Bankwest)  who  have  recently  merged  with  Westpac  and  CBA 
respectively. The Central Bank is the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) whose primary 
responsibilities are monetary policy, financial system stability, and the payments system. 
 
In  comparison,  as  per  figures  obtained  from  Office  of  the  Canadian S u p e r i n t e n d a n t  o f  
Financial Institutions (2009), Canada has a total of 78 banks with assets totalling USD $3 
trillion. 22 of these are domestic banks, with the others being primarily branches of foreign 
banks.  Of  the 22  domestic  banks,  9  are  public  companies  listed  on  the  Toronto  Stock 
Exchange. The ‘Big 5’ banks (Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of 
Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, and Canadian Imperial Bank) have total assets of USD 
$2.4 trillion, approximately 80% of the total Canadian domestic banking market. 
 
In  the  US,  FDIC  (Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  2009)  shows  just  over  eight 
thousand banks with total assets of USD $12 trillion. Only 52 of these banks are listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). These 52 banks represent approximately 65% of 
total US bank assets. The remaining entities are smaller commercial banks, mutual savings 
banks or branches / offices of foreign banks. The 5 dominant banks are JP Morgan, Bank of 
America,  Citigroup,  Wells  Fargo,  and  US  Bancorp,  with  Total  Assets  of  $5.8  Trillion 
representing close to half of the total US banking market. 
 
Europe  (including  the  UK)  has  extremely  large  banks w i t h  s e v e r a l  E u r o p e a n  b a n k s  
featuring among the world’s largest 15 banks (including Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit 
Agricole, Credit Suisse, DeutscheBank, ING, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Societe 
Generale, Unicredit and UBS). 15 of the world’s largest 25 Banks are European, with these 
banks having Total Assets of $30 trillion, nearly double the combined assets of all the 




Table 1. Key Growth and Risk Indicators for Australian Banks  
 
Figures  are  calculated  from  RBA  Statistics  (2009f)  for  all  banks  operating  in    Australia  (58  banks  per 
paragraph 2 of Section 3). Other ADI’s (Building Societies and Credit Unions) are not included. Impaired 
assets refer to non-accrual (income may no longer be accrued ahead of its receipt because there is doubt about 
the  ultimate  collectability  of  principal  and/or  interest)  and  restructured  assets  (modified  to  provide f o r  
concessions  of  interest or  principal  exposures),  both on-  and  off-balance sheet, plus  any  assets  acquired 
through the enforcement of security conditions. Provisions include specific and collective provisions. Tier 1 
and Total capital ratios are as per Basel requirements. A minimum of 8% is required for total capital of which 
at least half must be Tier 1. Risk weighted assets are also as per Basel requirements, where different assets 
have different risk weightings for the purpose of calculating capital. The equity ratio is total shareholder 
equity to total assets (no risk-weighting applied).  Amounts are all in Australian dollars. 
 
 
The figures in Table 1 show that Australian banks continue to grow total assets, although 
the growth to March 2009 slowed to 9% as compared to 22% the previous year. APRA 
(2008) reports that growth is driven predominantly by housing loans which account for 
52.1% of total bank assets. 
 
Total assets have doubled over the past 5 years, and have continued to increase over the 
past year. A significant increase is shown in impaired assets. However, this is off a very 























Mar-2000     958   0.61 
             
0.73   7.38  9.88            671   7.09% 
Mar-2001 
        
1,139   0.59 
             
0.65   6.88  9.77            790   6.77% 
Mar-2002 
            
1,118   0.69 
             
0.71   7.85  10.50            763   7.16% 
Mar-2003 
            
1,178   0.58 
             
0.61   7.69  10.00            819   6.95% 
Mar-2004 
            
1,352   0.41 
             
0.54   7.55  10.06            928   6.90% 
Mar-2005 
            
1,489   0.27 
             
0.48   7.87  10.88         1,013   7.41% 
Mar-2006 
            
1,709   0.21 
             
0.43   7.68  10.52         1,133   6.97% 
Mar-2007 
            
1,953   0.19 
             
0.38   7.56  10.38         1,277   6.78% 
Mar-2008 
            
2,387   0.34 
   
0.39   7.31  10.49         1,337   5.88% 





















Mar - 2000 5,725       1.9 4,613       2.0 1,431       1.1
Mar - 2001 6,226       2.1 5,702       1.9 1,577       1.4
Mar - 2002 6,391       1.9 5,496       2.0 1,651       1.6
Mar - 2003 7,087       1.6 6,639       1.8 1,703       1.6
Mar - 2004 7,620       1.4 7,373       1.6 1,754       1.1
Mar - 2005 8,308       1.4 8,330       1.9 1,877       0.6
Mar - 2006 9,125       1.5 9,993       2.0 2,083       0.5
Mar - 2007 9,872       2.4 11,365      2.1 2,375       0.4
Mar - 2008 11,117      4.8 12,364      2.6 2,727       0.5
Mar - 2009 12,127      8.8 12,869      6.6 3,021       0.9
US UK Canada
standards. Provisions for doubtful debts have not quite doubled over the past year, and are 
at slightly lower levels than in the early 2000’s.  
 
Summary comparative asset growth and impaired asset figures are provided in Table 2 for 
selected global regions. All regions show continued asset growth during the GFC period.  
 




US figures include commercial banks as classified by the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), and all figures are 
obtained  from  FRB  (2009)  statistical  reports.  The  US  impaired  asset  column  shows  loans  classified  as 
delinquent, which are loans past thirty days or more and still accruing interest as well as those in non-accrual 
status, measured as a percentage of end-of period loans. Total UK bank Assets are obtained from Bankstats 
(Bank  of  England,  2009a)  and  include  banks  only  (excludes  building  societies  and  other  monetary 
institutions). UK impaired assets are loans for the 5 major banks classified as impaired assets from 2005 and 
as non-performing loans prior to this date. Figures subsequent to 2005 are obtained from the Bank of England 
(2009b) and KPMG (2009), and prior to 2005 from the annual reports of the banks themselves. Impaired 
assets  for  both  the  UK  and  Canada  are  calculated  as i m p a ir e d  l o a n s  a n d  a d v a n c e s ( a s  p r e s e n t ed  i n  t h e  
financial statements) compared to total loans and advances (as presented on the face of the balance sheet). 
Impaired assets for Canada and the UK follow a similar definition to those for Australia as defined in Table 1. 
Canadian total assets and impaired assets are for all banks classified domestic as obtained from the Office of 
the  Superintendant  of  Financial  Institutions  Canada ( 2 0 0 9 ) .  F i g u r e s  w e r e  e i t h e r  t a k e n  a t  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  
reporting date shown in column 1 or the closest reporting date to it. Amounts are all in USD. 
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The US shows delinquency rates increasing approximately five-fold in the 3 years to the 
second  quarter  of  2009,  and  doubling  over  the  past  year.  In  their  2009  2
nd Q u a r t e r l y  
Banking  Profile  Report,  FDIC    (Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  2009)  shows 
continued aggregate bank losses for the industry, reducing total bank assets,  increasing 
charge  off  rates  and  continued  rises  in  loan  loss  reserves  to  2.77%.  The  UK  shows  a 
trebling of impaired assets in the year to March 2008. The BOE Credit Conditions Survey 
(2008a) reports rising default rates, widening spreads, and reduced credit availability to 
households  and  businesses  due  to  economic  outlook  concerns  as  well  as  the  cost  and 
availability  of  funds.  The  survey  shows  an  expectation  that  these  circumstances  will 
continue going forward. The Financial Stability Report (Bank of England, 2009c) shows 
mortgage arrears nearly trebling from the first quarter 2008 to first quarter 2009. Canadian 
banks’ impaired assets show the lowest increase of all the regions during the GFC, and at 
March 2009 are just under double the prior year, at very similar levels to Australian banks. 
Indeed, Canada’s impaired assets, whilst increasing during the GFC, are at lower levels to 
those experienced in the early 2000’s following the bursting of the technology bubble and 
the terrorist attacks in the US. 
 
Parallels have been drawn between the Australian and Canadian financial sectors (Stevens, 
2009). The major banks in both countries reported similar returns on equity (Canada 14.5% 
and Australia 17%), which in both cases was down on the preceding two years. Banks in 
both  countries  had  low  holdings  of  complex  securities  in  comparison  to  international 
standards,  and  both  had  conservative  lending  standards.  Whilst  both  countries  show 
increases in mortgage arrears,  households in these countries seem to having less trouble 
servicing debt than those in the US and UK.  
 
Tier 1 and total capital in Table 1 for Australian banks are showing an increasing trend, 
both ratios well above the regulatory requirements of 4% and 8% respectively. The total 
equity ratio (shareholders funds to total assets) is just over half of the total capital ratio, 
showing that assets, on average, are being discounted at nearly 50% to obtain risk weighted 
assets. This is in line with the high housing loan component of the Australian banks, which  
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attract a lower risk weighting than commercial borrowers. Table 3 provides a comparison to 
other global areas. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Capital Ratios 2008 
 
 T i e r   1   C a p i t a l   r a t i o  
(%) 




Australia  8.4  11.4  6.2 
Canada  11.8  14.5  5.2 
UK  8.1  12.1  3.9 
Other Europe  8.9  11.6  3.2 
US  10.4  13.1  7.1 
 
Figures for all regions are taken at quarterly reporting date March 2009, or closest reporting date to it. Tier 1 
and Total Capital figures are as reported by the banks in accordance with Basel requirements.  Equity ratio in 
all cases is calculated as total shareholder equity / total assets. Figures for Australian banks are as per table 1. 
All figures for Canada obtained from Office of the Superintendant of Financial Institutions Canada (2009) for 
all domestic banks. All figures for UK are from the KPMG (2009) average for the 5 major UK banks. Tier 1 
and Tier 2 ratios for Other Europe include Euro Area large and complex banking groups as reported by the 
European Central Bank (2009). Equity ratios are calculated from DataStream shareholder equity and total 
asset figures for the US and non-UK European banks used in this study as described in Section 6. US Tier 1 
and Tier 2 figures are obtained from Federal Reserve Bank Statistics for Commercial Banks. 
 
 
The equity ratio of just over 6% for Australian banks is higher than most European banks, 
slightly higher than Canadian banks, but somewhat lower than in the US.  The differential 
between risk weighted and absolute capital ratios is not as marked for Australia as for UK 
and other European banks. Discrepancies among banks between the Basel risk weighted 
approach and absolute ratios have led to many parties, for example the Swiss National 
Bank  (Blum,  2007;  Hildebrand,  2008)  and  Bank  of  England  (2008b),  calling  for  the 
introduction  of minimum  leverage  ratios to  run in  parallel  with  the  existing  regulatory 
approach. Indeed The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) has already  
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introduced  such  a  measure  for  the  two  major  Swiss  banks.    In  Australia,  APRA  has 
generally taken a conservative approach to the risk weighting of assets, introducing a higher 
risk weighting to apply to higher risk non-standard home loans, and in 2003 undertook 
stress testing on home loans. Subject to the limitations of the stress testing methodology, 
the aggregate results reported by APRA (Esho, Coleman, Sellathura, & Thavabalan, 2005) 
indicated that Australian ADIs were well capitalised, with good Loan to Value (LVR) ratios 
and well placed to withstand a housing market shock that is far more severe than any 
nationwide experience in Australian history. Over 90 per cent of ADIs were deemed able to 
survive  the  stress  event,  without  breaching  minimum r e g u l a t o r y  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
Indeed, confidence in the robustness of Australian home loan portfolios had previously led 
APRA (2001) to make recommendations to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
for a reduced risk weighting (from 50% to 20%) to apply to home loans. The stress test 
findings  would appear to have since been vindicated by the performance of Australian 
banks through the GFC. 
 
Interest rates in Australia have not experienced the same volatility levels as some of their 
global counterparts. Figure 1 compares cash rates between Australia, US, UK, and Canada. 
The Australian cash rate moved from a low of 4.25% in Dec 2001, peaking at 7.25% in 
March 2008 (an increase of 1.7x), and falling to 3% in April 2009. In contrast, the US Fed 
funds rate rose from 1% in June 2003 to 5.25% (an increase of 5.25x) in June 2006, and 
down to 0% in Dec 2008.  Rates in the UK and Canada have also fallen to much lower 
levels than in Australia. Due to strong economic data, the RBA has commenced interest 
rate increases, whereas rates in all 3 other regions have not increased. 
 
   
14 
Figure 1. Comparison of Central Bank Interest Rates.  
 
 
Figures are  obtained from RBA (2009b) statistics for official interest rates of Central Banks. Included in the 
graph are the Australian target cash rate, the Canada target rate, the United Kingdom official bank rate, and 
the United States federal funds target rate.  
 
Australia had a housing boom in the early 2000’s. For some regions, such as Western 
Australia  which experienced  a  commodities  led boom, t h is  c ont i nu e d thr o ug h t o 20 07. 
House prices in most Australian areas softened over the past few years, but have fared 
better than many countries. House prices reduced by about 4% in Australia over 12 months 
to March 2009, compared to reductions of between 10-25% in areas of US and Europe. 
Nonetheless,  housing  loan  arrears  increased  from  0.32%  in  2007  to  0.48%  in  2008, 
associated with the general downturn in the economy, and associated unemployment.   
 
Overall, this section has shown that there has been a substantial increase in Australian bank 
risk  indicators  such  as  impaired  assets  and  provisions.  However  these  are  modest  in 




















































































4.  VaR and CVaR 
The  prior  section  has  highlighted  some  of  the  key  trends  taking  place  in  the  banking 
industry. This included the extreme volatility in bank share prices. This is an important 
component in the measurement of market asset value fluctuations and in turn impacts on 
PD (as covered in Section 5). VaR is a widely used method for measuring market risk, with 
CVaR  providing  a  measurement  for  extreme  risk.    Thus  prior  to  examining  default 
probabilities using the Merton model, this study examines share price VaR and CVaR prior 
to and during the GFC, with this section explaining these metrics.   
 
VaR’s use in the banking industry escalated since being adopted by Basel as the primary 
measure for calculating market risk capital requirements. The metric measures potential 
losses over a specific time period at a given level of confidence for a specific time period.  
Internationally,  there  is  extensive  literature  coverage  about  VaR.  Examples  include 
RiskMetricsTM  (1996)  who  introduced  and  popularised V a R ,  J o r i o n  ( 1 9 9 6 ) ,  a n d  
comprehensive discussion of VaR by more than seventy recognised authors in the VaR 
Modeling Handbook and the VaR Implementation Handbook (2009a, 2009b). In summary, 
there are 3 methods applied for calculating VaR. The Variance-Covariance (parametric) 
method estimates VaR on the assumption of a normal distribution. The Historical method 
groups  historical  losses  in  categories  from  best  to w o r s t  a n d  c a l c u l a t e s  V a R  o n  t h e  
assumption of history repeating itself. Monte Carlo Simulation simulates multiple random 
scenarios. In order to exclude the possibility of distortion of results due to sensitivity to the 
method chosen, we use all 3 methods.  
 
As the parametric method  assumes returns are normally distributed, to obtain VaR for a 
single asset X, all that needs to be calculated is the mean and standard deviation (). Using 
standard  distribution  tables,  and  given  the  normal  curve  assumption,  we  automatically 
know where the worst 1% and 5% lie on the curve: 
95% confidence = -1.645 x x 
99% confidence = -2.330 x x  
16 
When calculating VaR, it is usual practice (and is the method used by RiskMetrics) to not 
use actual asset figures, but the logarithm of the ratio of price relatives, i.e. the logarithm of 














  (1) 
 
For the historical method, daily returns for assets are calculated in the same way as for the 
parametric method as per equation 1. Instead of assuming a normal distribution, the actual 
5
th p e r c e n t i l e  v a l u e  i s  t a k e n  a s  V a R  a t  t h e  9 5 %  c o n f i d ence  level.  Because  historical 
weightings in a portfolio can change, thus distorting VaR for the current portfolio, it is 
usual practice to use historical simulation for this method whereby the value of the portfolio 
is calculated assuming constant weightings (based on the current portfolio weightings, for 
which we use market capitalisation) for each day in the period.    
 
Monte Carlo analysis generates future simulated prices, assuming a random walk. Using 
closing prices, mean and standard deviation of returns, thousands of random variables are 
generated (we use 20,000) which are then used to calculate VaR, with the 95
th lowest value 
in the simulation being VaR at the 95% confidence level.      
 
A key criticism of VaR is that it says nothing of  risk beyond VaR. Critics have included 
Standard and Poor’s analysts (Samanta, Azarchs, & Hill, 2005) due to inconsistency of 
VaR application across institutions and lack of tail risk assessment. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, 
& Heath (1999; 1997) found VaR to have undesirable mathematical properties; such as lack 
of sub-additivity. Criticism of VaR has mounted since the onset of the GFC with VaR 
being perceived as having a focus on historical risk and not measuring extreme tail risk.  
 
In addition to VaR, this paper examines CVaR which considers losses beyond VaR. If VaR 
is calculated at 95%, then CVaR is the average of the 5% extreme returns. Pflug (2000), 
showed CVaR to be a coherent measure, which does not contain the undesirable properties 
of VaR.  CVaR has been used to measure tail risk in an Australian setting by Allen and  
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Powell (2007), who find significant correlation between VaR and CVaR in ranking risk 
among Australian sectors (customers of banks as opposed to banks which are examined in 
this study) prior to the GFC and  Powell and Allen (2009) who use CVaR to show how 
relative risk has changed among sectors since the onset of the GFC.   
 
5.  Structural Models and PD 
The prior section has explained VaR and CVaR which will be used to measure market risk, 
a key component of asset price fluctuations. These in turn, are important to measuring 
distance  to  default  (DD)  and  probability  of  default ( P D )  u s i n g  t h e  M e r t o n  s t r u c t u r a l  
methodology, which is explained in this section. The model is based on the option pricing 
methodology  of  Black  &  Scholes  (1973).  The  model  uses  fluctuations  in  market  asset 
values combined with asset and debt levels of a firm to measure DD (measured by number 
of standard deviations). The firm defaults when asset values fall below debt levels.  
 
In the Merton model, equity and the market value of the firm’s assets are related as follows: 
) ( ) ( 2 1 d FN e d V E
rT       =   (2) 
 
E = market value of firm’s equity 
V = market value of firm’s assets 
F = face value of firm’s debt 
r = instantaneous risk free rate  
N = cumulative standard normal distribution function 












=   (3) 
T d d v     = 1 2   (4) 
 
v is the standard deviation of asset returns. Volatility and equity are related under the 
Merton model as follows:  
18 
v E d N
E
V





 =   (5)              
 







  µ ) 5.0 ( ) / ln(
2   +
=   (6) 
µ = an estimate of the annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets, which can be calculated as 
the mean of the change in lnV (Vassalou & Xing, 2004).  
 
Probability of Default (PD) can be determined using the normal distribution. For example, 
if DD = 2 standard deviations, we know there is a 95% probability that assets will vary 
between 1 and two standard deviations. There is a 2.5% probability that they will fall by 
more than 2 standard deviations. Using N as the cumulative standard normal distribution 
function, PD is measured as: 
) ( DD N PD   =   (7) 
 
Moody’s KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) is a popular model used by banks to measure PD. 
KMV  calculates  DD  based  on  the  Merton  approach,  but i n s t e a d  o f  u s i n g  a  n o r m a l  
distribution to calculate PD, KMV use their own worldwide  database to  determine  PD 
associated with each default level. In KMV, debt is taken as the value of all short-term 
liabilities (one year and under) plus half the book value of all long term debt outstanding. T 
is usually set as 1  year. The approach to  calculating v, as per KMV and Bharath  and 
Shumway (2008) and (Vassalou & Xing, 2004) involves first estimating  of equity from 
historical data (as we have done in section 4), and then applying an iterative procedure. An 











E V                    (8) 
 
For each trading day, V is computed by applying E to equation 5. Thus we obtain daily 
values for V every day. The daily log return is calculated and  of asset returns calculated,  
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which is then used as V for the next iteration to estimate new asset values. This process is 
repeated until asset returns converge to 10E-3. Once we obtain the converged value of V, 
we back out V through equation 2. 
 
We use the same definition as KMV for debt and also set T to 1 year. We also use same 
iterative  process  as  described  above  for  estimating  v.  In line  with  Vassalou  and  Xing 
(2004), we calculate µ as the annual mean of change in lnV. The risk free rate used is the 
annual  average  1  year  indicative  mid  rate  for  selected  Commonwealth  Government 
securities as provided by the Reserve Bank of Australia (2009d). 
 
We have modified the Merton model to incorporate a CVaR approach due to the fact that 
firms are most likely to default under extreme circumstances. Instead of using the standard 
deviation of all asset returns, we use the standard deviation of the worst 5% of returns 
(which we label CStdev) to calculate conditional distance to default (CDD) and conditional 






v ) 5.0 ( ) / ln(
2   µ   +
=   (9) 
and 
) ( CDD N CPD   =   (10) 
 
Other studies which use the Merton model in an Australian context include Sy (2007, 2008) 
who focuses on home loans and proposes a revised causal framework for estimating default 
which  incorporates  serviceability;  Powell  and  Allen ( 2 0 0 9 )  w h o  r a n k  d e f a u l t  r i s k  o f  
industries  (bank  customers);  Gharghori,  Chan  and  Faff  (2007)  who  compare  the 
performance  of  option-based  and  accounting-based  models,  Chan,  Faff  and  Koffman 
(2008) who examine the role of default risk in asset pricing using microcap stocks; and 
Tanthanongsakkun  and  Treepongkaruna  (2008)  who  examine  how  the  Merton  model 
combined  with  size  and  book-to-market  ratios  effectively  explain  credit  ratings  when 
compared to accounting ratios. No other studies are located which apply the Merton model  
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specifically to bank credit risk in an Australian setting, and the CPD concept is unique to 
the authors.   
 
6.  Data and Methodology 
Having explained the VaR, CVaR, DD and PCD metrics, this section now proceeds to 
explain our data selection, and how these metrics will be used in this study. 
 
6.1  Data 
All data is obtained from DataStream. As per Section 1, although there are 58 banks in 
Australia, there are only 13 Australian owned banks according to APRA (with assets of 
AUD $2.3 trillion totalling 88% of all banking assets in Australia), the rest (totalling only 
12%)  being  branches  of  foreign  banks.  At  2008,  the  ASX  showed  12  listed  banks. 
Macquarie was classified as ‘Diversified Financials” on the ASX, but we have included 
Macquarie in our analysis due to being classified as a bank by APRA, giving 13 entities in 
total. St. George is now wholly owned by Commonwealth Bank, but we have included this 
separately, as it was a separately listed bank to end 2008. These 13 entities  include the 4 
major banks and 9 smaller / regional banks. A complete list of these entities is shown in our 
results section in table 4.   
 
As  discussed  in  Section  1,  for  comparative  purposes w e  i n c l u d e  U S ,  E u r o p e a n  a n d  
Canadian banks. Section 3 shows that although there are over 8,000 banks in the US, there 
are only 52 US owned listed banks, with assets of USD 7.8 trillion representing about 65% 
of total bank assets in the US. The remainder are smaller unlisted banks, mutually owned 
savings banks or branches of foreign banks. We include all 52 banks in our analysis. Due to 
the large number of European countries and banks, we use only the 15 largest European 
banks by total assets (aggregate equivalent to USD 30 trillion), with representation from the 
UK, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. These European banks 
are all among listings (BankersAlmanac, 2009; The Banker, 2009) of the world’s largest 25 
banks. Section 3 shows that there are 22 domestic Canadian banks, 9 of them being public 
companies listed on the Toronto Stock exchange. We include all 9 listed banks (including  
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the  ‘big  5’  and  4  smaller  banks)  with  total  assets  of  USD  2.5  trillion,  representing 
approximately 80% of total bank assets in Canada.    
 
 We  obtain  10  years  of  daily  equity  prices  for  each b a n k .  O n ly  t r a d i ng  day s  a r e  u s e d  
(approximately 250 days per annum), thus excluding all weekends and holidays. We also 
obtain the required balance sheet data from Datastream for calculating VaR, CVaR, DD 
and PD as described in Sections 4, 5, 6.2 and 6.3. This includes daily market capitalisation 
(used in calculation of daily asset values and for weighting banks to calculate VaR and 
CVaR);  annual  total  liabilities,  current  liabilities  and  long  term  liabilities  (used  in 
calculation  of  DD).    In  line  with  KMV,  we  compute  liabilities  as  the  sum  of  current 
liabilities and one half of long term debt.  
 
We compare trends for each of the 10 years (1 year / 250 day windows). In addition, we 
divide the data into a pre-GFC period and a GFC period. The GFC period is two years from 
2007-2008 (500 day window), and the pre-GFC period is the 7 year period from 2000 – 
2006 (7 years aligns with the Basel Accord Advanced requirements for measuring credit 
risk). We use an F test to compare share price volatility and market asset volatility between 
the two periods, testing for significance at both the 95% and 99% levels. 
 
6.2   VaR and CVaR Methodology 
We use all 3 VaR methodologies (parametric, historical and Monte Carlo simulation) as 
described in Section 4. We calculate the returns using the logarithm of price relatives every 
day for each bank for the past 10 years. For total bank portfolios, we use an undiversified 
approach, whereby total VaR is the weighted average of the individual bank VaRs. As we 
are  examining  VaR  and  CVaR  of  equities,  we  weight  each  bank  according  to  market 
capitalisation. Correlation (diversification) among assets in the portfolio is not calculated as 
we are not calculating VaR for investment purposes, and do not need to show the effect of 
portfolio diversification, and our total bank figures are  based on a weighted average of the 
underlying bank VaRs (for example the 95% daily VaR for the S&P/ASX200 Bank index 
which  contains  the  largest  6  banks  is  0.0302  during t h e  G F C  p e r i o d  c o m p a r e d  t o  a  
weighted average for the same banks of 0.0337, the difference being that the index is based  
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on a diversified portfolio of 6 banks as opposed to a we ig hted a verage of VaRs). The 
weighted average is a more meaningful figure to compare individual banks against. VaR is 
usually measured at high levels of confidence, either 95% or 99%, with CVaR measured as 
the returns beyond VaR (5% or 1%). As the GFC period relates to only 2 years with 250 
daily returns each year, for a confidence level of 99%, CVaR would only encompass 2.5 
returns for each of the 2 years, giving 5 returns in total for each bank. We have thus chosen 
CVaR  at  5%  (VaR  95%),  which  provides  analysis  of  a  reasonable  number  of  extreme 
returns. 
 
For  the  parametric  method,  based  on  a  normal  distribution,  we  multiply  the  standard 
deviation by 1.645 to obtain VaR at the 95% confidence level. For the historical method, 
we calculate VaR as being the lowest 95
th value over the period. For Monte Carlo we 
generate  20,000  random  scenarios  for  the  pre-GFC  period  (based  on  the  pre-GFC 
distribution) and 20,000 for the post-GFC period (based on the post-GFC distribution), and 
then calculate VaR as the lowest 95
th value for each period. For each of the 3 methods used, 
CVaR is calculated as the average of the returns beyond the VaR measure (the worst 5%).     
 
6.3  Structural Methodology 
We  apply  the  Merton  methodology  discussed  in  Section  5.  Using  the  equity  returns 
obtained in Section 6.2, and the relationship between equity and assets as described in 
section 5, we estimate an initial asset return. The daily log return is calculated and new 
asset values estimated. This is applied every day. Following KMV, this process is repeated 
until asset returns converge. 
 
CVaR methodology is incorporated into the structural model to obtain CDD and CPD as 
per Section 5. 
 
7.  Results and Discussion 
This section presents and discusses the results obtained using the methodology and data 
described in Sections 4 – 6. We commence with the VaR and CVaR results (summarised in  
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Tables 4 and 5), followed by the outcomes for DD and PD (summarised in Table 6). Trends 
are compared to the US, Europe and Canada.  
 
7.1  VaR and CVaR Results 
 
Table 4. VaR and CVaR Results for Australian Banks 
 
VaR and CVaR calculations are as per Section 6.2. In summary, parametric VaR multiplies the standard 
deviation of daily returns by 1.645 (being 95% confidence level based on a normal distribution), Historical 
VaR is based on the actual historical 95



























































































ANZ 0.0192 0.0250 0.0268 0.0261 0.0303 0.0338
BANK OF QUEENSLAND 0.0208 0.0293 0.0292 0.0291 0.0350 0.0366
BENDIGO & ADELAIDE 0.0218 0.0308 0.0270 0.0308 0.0360 0.0301
COMMONWEALTH 0.0181 0.0246 0.0254 0.0253 0.0287 0.0315
HOMELOANS 0.0457 0.0700 0.0641 0.0700 0.0859 0.0807
MACQUARIE 0.0244 0.0352 0.0343 0.0352 0.0418 0.0432
MORTGAGE CHOICE 0.0365 0.0483 0.0514 0.0505 0.0561 0.0645
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA 0.0205 0.0277 0.0291 0.0296 0.0319 0.0366
ROCK 0.0216 0.0359 0.0305 0.0323 0.0432 0.0383
ST. GEORGE 0.0173 0.0227 0.0244 0.0243 0.0265 0.0308
SUNCORP-METWAY 0.0209 0.0299 0.0296 0.0300 0.0356 0.0373
WESTPAC 0.0186 0.0242 0.0244 0.0252 0.0285 0.0331
WIDE BAY 0.0226 0.0357 0.0264 0.0348 0.0437 0.0398
ALL BANKS 0.0198 0.0232 0.0266 0.0286 0.0326 0.0339
Correlation with parametric method 0.9788 0.9890 0.9890 0.9823
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** ** **
GFC
ANZ 0.0351 0.0434 0.0490 0.0630 0.0740 0.0682
BANK OF QUEENSLAND 0.0353 0.0445 0.0502 0.0592 0.0711 0.0697
BENDIGO & ADELAIDE 0.0408 0.0455 0.0581 0.0677 0.0792 0.0801
COMMONWEALTH 0.0308 0.0411 0.0438 0.0516 0.0624 0.0607
HOMELOANS 0.0519 0.0574 0.0733 0.1059 0.1260 0.1025
MACQUARIE 0.0561 0.0698 0.0744 0.1007 0.1204 0.1107
MORTGAGE CHOICE 0.0392 0.0413 0.0562 0.0729 0.0778 0.0780
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA 0.0361 0.0429 0.0513 0.0587 0.0715 0.0714
ROCK 0.0316 0.0380 0.0446 0.0614 0.0710 0.0623
ST. GEORGE 0.0375 0.0446 0.0524 0.0630 0.0739 0.0726
SUNCORP-METWAY 0.0382 0.0470 0.0542 0.0669 0.0775 0.0750
WESTPAC 0.0327 0.0400 0.0460 0.0537 0.0650 0.0638
WIDE BAY 0.0229 0.0297 0.0322 0.0414 0.0480 0.0448
ALL BANKS 0.0347 0.0428 0.0488 0.0585 0.0702 0.0679
Correlation with parametric method 0.9592 0.9947 0.9921 0.9653
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** ** ** 
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then identifies the worst 95
th simulated return. Annual VaR can be obtained for each method by multiplying 
daily VaR by the square root of 250. Figures are undiversified and represent the weighted average of the 
individual banks.  CVaR is calculated as the average of the worst 5% of actual returns (those beyond the 95% 
VaR) for each of the 3 methods. The pre-GFC category calculates daily VaR for the 7 year period from 2000-
2006.  The GFC category calculates daily VaR for the 2 year window from 2007-2008. 
 
 
There  is  a  very  strong  correlation  between  the  outcomes  of  the  3  different  modelling 
techniques, significant at the 99.9% level. A key reason for this is the large number of 
historical observations, as well as the large number of forward simulations (20,000) used in 
our analysis. A high VaR or CVaR for a bank using any one of the models, corresponds 
with  a  high  VaR  or  CVaR  for  that  bank  using  any  of  the  other  two  models.  What  is 
somewhat different is the actual VaR and CVaR levels between the models. The historical 
and Monte Carlo methods provide very closely matched outcomes, but both of these are 
slightly higher than the parametric outcomes, which means the parametric model is slightly 
underestimating the tail risk. For each bank, there is an increase in both VaR and CVaR 
from pre-GFC to GFC. Table 5 shows yearly VaR and CVaR figures. To avoid excessively 
detailed  output,  we  have  only  shown  the  parametric  method  here,  however  as  per  our 
discussion on the outcomes for table 4, the other models show the same trend, just at 
slightly higher levels.  
 
Table 5. Pre-GFC / GFC Comparison of VaR and CVaR Results for Australian Banks 
 
 
VaR CVaR VaR CVaR
Year: Pre-GFC / GFC Summary:
1999 0.0178 0.0328 1.Pre-GFC 0.0198 0.0286
2000 0.0229 0.0320 2.GFC 0.0347 0.0585
2001 0.0227 0.0317
2002 0.0222 0.0310 Statistical testing:
2003 0.0200 0.0280   0.0120 0.0174
2004 0.0151 0.0211   0.0211 0.0355
2005 0.0141 0.0197 

 0.0001 0.0003
2006 0.0154 0.0216 

 0.0004 0.0013
2007 0.0170 0.0301 F3 . 0 7 5 0 4 . 1 7 6 7
2008 0.0511 0.0868 p< . 0 0 0 1 < . 0 0 0 1
Significance ** ** 
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The  left  section  of  the  table  shows  Daily  VaR  and  CVaR  for  each  year  (12  month  windows).  VaR  is 
calculated on a parametric basis as described in Section 6.2, whereby the standard deviation of daily returns is 
multiplied by 1.645 (being 95% confidence level based on a normal distribution). CVaR is calculated as the 
average of the worst 5% of actual returns (those beyond the 95% VaR). The top right section of the table 
groups VaR and CVaR into pre-GFC (up to 2006) and GFC (2007 - 2008) categories.  The third section of the 
table undertakes F testing to test for variance in volatility between the pre-GFC and GFC categories. 1 is the 




2, whereby a 
value of 1 shows no difference between the samples and a value of 3 shows variance of 3x higher in the GFC 
period than the pre-GFC period. * denotes significance at the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. 
 
The  table  shows  both  VaR  and  CVaR  reducing  during  the  mid  2000’s  and  increasing 
sharply over the GFC period. CVaR shows a similar trend at a higher level. The higher VaR 
during  the  early  2000’s  is  attributable  to  several  factors.  Firstly,  global  share  markets 
entered a much anticipated cool-off following a period of very high growth during the 
1990s. Secondly, the Federal Reserve Bank and many other Central Banks made several 
interest rate increases to cool spending and inflation. Thirdly, the dot-com bubble burst in 
March 2000, sending high tech stocks tumbling. Fourthly, the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 caused markets to further decline. It was only after 2003 that markets entered a 
period of sustained growth, which continued up until the start of the GFC. This period of 
growth  and  stability  is  reflected  in  lower  VaR  and  CVaR  in  the  mid  2000’s.  Similar 
patterns were experienced in Canada (which is highly reliant on the US economy), the 
European Union, and other world markets. Canada, in particular, experienced problems 
such as high unemployment and high volatility in the telecommunications and technology 
sectors in the early 2000’s. 
 
Despite the rosy picture painted at the start of this paper, whereby Australian banks show 
good profitability and improved credit rating in 2007 which have been maintained during 
the  GFC,  the  share  price  has  been  very  volatile.  The  annualised  VaR  in  2008  is 
approximately 80%. F values show that the GFC period variance is three times higher than 
pre-GFC. CVaR variance is four times higher, showing a greater spread between VaR and 
CVaR during the GFC. This volatility difference is significant at the 99% level.  
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Table 5 shows banks’ VaR increasing from 0.0154 for 2006 to 0.0511 for 2008 (an increase 
of 3.3 times). In order to benchmark the bank results, we also calculated VaR and CVaR for 
the market as a whole, using the All Ordinaries (All Ords) index which includes the largest 
500 Australian listed shares by market capitalisation and accounts for approximately 95% 
of the values of all shares traded on the ASX. All Ords daily VaR increased from   0.0249 
to 0.0441 over the same period, an increase of 1.8x. Deducting the market increase from the 
bank increase, shows the market adjusted bank VaR increase to be 1.5x.  The same process 
was applied to CVaR, with an increase of 4.0x for banks and 2.9x for the market, giving 
banks a market adjusted bank VaR increase of 1.1x. Thus, while clearly the overall market 
risk showed a large increase  (and hence bank  customers  as  they  are  drawn  from these 
industries), the bank specific risk was over and above this.  
 
There are several factors which could explain why banks show a higher increase in VaR 
and CVaR than other industries. The fallout in global financial markets, particularly in the 
US and Europe, and the failure of major banks such as Lehman Bros. and Northern Rock, 
sparked  fears  of  contagion  to  all  global  markets.  Additionally,  the  wholesale  and 
securitisation markets dried up, making it extremely difficult for banks to obtain funding. 
Australian banks obtain 48% of funding from wholesale sources of which 54% is sourced 
from  offshore  financial  markets  (Australian  Bankers A s s o c i a t i o n ,  2 0 0 9 ) .  T h i s  w a s  
exacerbated by market conditions being very poor for raising capital, and by market fears 
of rising unemployment and increasing corporate failures affecting loan repayments. All 
these factors were coupled with sharply rising impaired assets and provisions as shown in 
section 3.       
 
As shown by the comparative trends in Figure 2, both the US and European portfolios show 
higher volatility than the Australian banks.  Nonetheless, all 3 regions show substantial 
increases in VaR and CVaR from 2007. Bank stock indices in the US and Europe plunged 
by up to 85% over the GFC period compared to the 58% drop in Australia. Canada starts 
off with VaR at levels similar to US and Europe, but during the GFC, these are at similar 

























































The figure compares the yearly VaR and CVaR Australian figures in Table 5 to the other 3 regions using 3 
point polynomial trend lines.  Daily data for the European and US banks is obtained from Datastream, and 
Daily VaR and CVaR for each year is calculated in exactly the same manner as for Australia in table 5, using 
the same 12 month windows.  
 
So far, we have only discussed results relating to share price volatility. These have a key 
impact on asset volatility, and the next step is to explore default probabilities based on the 
Merton model, which are a function of asset volatility and leverage. Based on balance sheet 
shareholder equity to total assets, as per table 3, Australian banks have equity of 6.2%, 
Canadian banks 5.2%, US banks 7.1%, and European banks 3.2%. Table 6 shows DD, 
CDD, PD and CPD. 
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7.2`  Default Risk Results 
 
Table 6. DD, CDD, PD and CPD Results. 
 
The top section of the table shows DD, PD, CPD and CDD figures for each year. Figures are computed from 
daily market value of asset returns using Merton / KMV methodology per Sections 5 and 6.3, with all data 
obtained from Datastream. CDD and CPD are based on the worst 5% of actual asset returns. The second 
section of the table groups data into pre-GFC and GFC categories. The GFC category includes the 2 year 
window from 2007 to 2008.  The pre-GFC category includes the 7 years from 2000-2006. The third section of 
the table undertakes F tests for variance in volatility of market asset values (as opposed to share price values 
in table 5) to assess the impact of the GFC. 1 is the standard deviation of daily asset returns for the pre-GFC 




2, whereby a value of 1 shows no difference between samples 
and a value of 3 shows volatility of 3 x higher in the GFC period than pre-GFC. * denotes significance at the 
95% level and ** at the 99% level. 
 
DD  increases  in  the  mid-2000’s  and  then  dramatically  reduces  in  2007  and  2008. 
Associated PD is extremely small up to 2006, increasing to 27% in 2008. Using our own 
DD CDD PD CPD
Annual figures:
1999 7.8385 4.0918 <0.1% <0.1%
2000 7.5752 4.4523 <0.1% <0.1%
2001 6.9326 4.2122 <0.1% <0.1%
2002 7.7138 4.5711 <0.1% <0.1%
2003 8.2710 4.8397 <0.1% <0.1%
2004 9.8635 5.3818 <0.1% <0.1%
2005 11.3099 5.7639 <0.1% <0.1%
2006 10.1931 5.1948 <0.1% <0.1%
2007 1.8069 0.5653 3.5% 28.6%
2008 0.5993 0.1962 27.4% 42.2%
Pre GFC / GFC Summary:
1.Pre-GFC 8.2566 5.1948 <0.1% <0.1%
2.GFC 1.1821 0.3927 11.9% 34.7%
Statistical testing:
  0.0018 0.0062







F3 . 1 3 8 0 4 . 2 6 2 2
p 1 <.0001 <.0001


































































CPD  model,  CPD  is  42%  during  the  extreme  5%  of  asset  value  fluctuations  in  2008. 
Comparing the 2 year GFC period to the 7 year pre-GFC period, PD leaps from almost 
negligible values to 12% PD and 35% CPD. The F statistic shows that variance in market 
asset value fluctuations has increased more than 3 times (4X on the most extreme values), 
with a 99% confidence level. Clearly, default risk has not stayed static as indicated by the 
external ratings of the banks.   
 







The figure compares the yearly DD and CPD Australian figures in Table 6 to the other 3 regions using 3 point 
polynomial trend lines.  Daily data for the European and US banks is obtained from Datastream, and DD and 
CDD for each year is calculated in exactly the same manner as for Australia in table 6, using the same 12 
month windows.  
 
The lower volatility levels of the Australian banks result in higher DD levels as compared 
to Europe and the US. The combination of high volatility and low equity means European 
banks fare the worst. Canada lies between the US/Europe and Australia in the earlier years 
but  has  a  higher  DD  during  the  GFC,  which  is  line  with  Canada’s  higher  bad  debt 
experience  following  the  technology  bubble  burst  and  US  terrorist  attacks  in  the  early 
2000’s as shown in Table 2, and lower bad debt experience during the GFC. All regions 
show a dramatic shift towards the default line in 2007 and 2008, brought about the huge 
drop in equity values in all 4 regions. Australia fares slightly better than Europe and US due 
to the lower drop in equities, but nonetheless shows a huge leap towards the default line, 
with all regions except Canada dropping well below DD of 1 and CPD of 0.5, with 
associated CPDs (calculated as per equation 10) all exceeding 40%. Canada’s CPD is 25%.   
30 
One could argue that the credit risk of all industries based on fluctuations in market asset 
values  deteriorated  during  the  GFC,  so  how  are  banks  different?  Table  7  shows  DD 
rankings for all sectors forming part of the Australian All Ords Index (which contains the 
500 largest listed firms by market capitalisation, including all Australian banks) pre-GFC as 
compared to during the GFC. Pre-GFC Banks were ranked 14th out of  20 industries (with 
1 being the least risky) based  on DD, which moved to 18
th during the GFC. On a CDD 
basis,  Banks  moved  from  8
th t o  1 8
th.  Only  Diversified  Financials  and  Automobiles  & 
Components were riskier during the GFC. This shows that Banks have shown a marked 
deterioration in credit risk relative to other industries as a whole.   
 
Table 7. Industry Comparison. 
 
DD and CD figures are calculated for each industry in the same manner as they are calculated for Banks in 
Table 6, and industries are then ranked from 1 (lowest risk) to 20 (highest risk). A higher ranking in the GFC 
column as compared to the pre-GFC column means the industry has been affected worse by the GFC than 
other industries as a whole. A lower ranking in the GFC column as compared to the pre-GFC column does not 
mean the industry has improved over the GFC, but that the industry has been affected less by the GFC than 
other industries as a whole.  
 
DD DD CDD CDD DD DD CDD CDD
Pre Pre Pre Pre
GFC GFC GFC GFC GFC GFC GFC GFC
Automobiles & Components 5.80 1.09 3.26 0.27 18 19 20 19
Banks 8.26 1.18 5.19 0.39 14 18 8 18
Capital Goods 8.49 3.10 4.99 0.83 12 16 13 16
Commercial Services & Supplies 7.80 5.34 4.53 1.51 15 9 15 11
Consumer Durables & Apparel 9.27 5.33 5.16 1.64 9 10 10 9
Diversified Financials 11.65 0.59 5.17 0.16 2 20 9 20
Energy 9.52 6.43 5.36 1.81 6 6 6 6
Food & Staples Retailing 10.06 6.05 5.33 1.80 4 7 7 7
Food Beverage & Tobacco 9.44 8.54 5.06 2.73 7 3 11 2
Healthcare Equipment & Services 8.86 10.71 5.86 3.13 10 1 41
Insurance 3.70 2.13 3.38 0.60 20 17 19 17
Media 9.97 5.53 5.00 1.75 5 8 12 8
Metals & Mining 8.50 3.88 5.86 1.11 11 14 5 14
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 7.64 6.65 4.54 2.14 16 5 144
Real Estate 11.54 3.40 6.26 0.94 3 15 2 15
Retailing 7.12 4.46 4.35 1.46 17 13 16 12
Technology 5.64 5.21 3.84 1.58 19 11 18 10
Telecommunication Services 9.40 7.07 6.59 2.13 8 4 1 5
Transportation 8.31 4.85 4.31 1.43 13 12 17 13
Utilities 13.93 8.61 6.17 2.61 1 2 3 3
8.54 4.33 4.95 0.54
Ranking Values 
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Similarly to our benchmarking in the VaR section, we can benchmark bank DD to industry 
DD  using  table  7.  DD  for  banks  reduced  from  8.26  pre-GFC  to  1.18  during  the  GFC 
(reduction of 7 times), which was a far larger reduction than the total industry DD reduction 
from  8.54  to  4.33  (2  times)  over  the  same  period.  This  gives  a  market  adjusted  DD 
reduction of 5 times. The DD of other industries represents risk that banks would be taking 
by lending to corporate customers in those industries. We therefore see that the riskiness of 
bank customers generally has increased substantially, and that there is also a large bank 
specific risk over and above this. DD is a combination of movement in market values, and 
equity levels.  The reason the increase in bank DD is so much higher than the market is a 
combination of the high movement in market values, as noted in our discussion on VaR, 
and the very low equity levels of banks as compared to the other industries. Table 3 shows 
equity levels of Australian banks of just over 6%. In comparison the average equity levels 
of all the companies in our All Ords sample is 46%.   
 
As previously mentioned, the PD values obtained from the Merton model are considered by 
KMV to be too low. Thus KMV use their worldwide database to calculate an empirically 
obtained EDF value for each DD value. KMV EDF values are not readily available for each 
DD, however KMV do provide EDF factors for each external rating. Using these EDF 
values, and the external ratings of each entity (Moody's Investor Services, 2009; Standard 
& Poor's, 2009b), we are able to obtain estimated  EDF’s for our All Ords portfolio (and 
their associated DD’s) using the inverse of the formula  PD = ) ( DD N   . We are then able to 













eP DD  and ep =  estimated weighted average DD  and standard deviation for the entire All 
Ords portfolio based on the external ratings of all entities, 
p DD  and p =  actual weighted average DD for the entire All Ords portfolio using the 
Merton model, and  
DDB = DD for Banks using the Merton model.  
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We  have  obtained  estimated  EDFs  (from  Lopez,  2004)  at  the  year  2000,  the 
commencement of our data sample. These EDFs range from 0.02% for AAA loans up to 
18.5% for the lowest rated (C) non-defaulting loans. We note that not only are the Merton 
values lower at the least risky end of the scale, but we see from Table 6 that Merton PD’s 
can go much higher at the other end of the scale as compared to the KMV ceiling of 18.5%. 
Thus the range of KMV default probabilities is narrower than obtained from the Merton 
model. By calibrating our Merton PD’s to KMV EDF at the start of our sample in 2002, 
then allowing the calibrated PD to fluctuate each year relative to our calculated change in 
asset  values  per  section  67.2  and  mapped  to  the  EDF d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  w e  c a n  c a l c u l a t e    
calibrated PD (and DD) for each year. Similarly we can calculate calibrated CDD and CPD 
based on the worst 5% of asset value fluctuations. The outcomes for 7 years are shown in 
table 8. These show the same trend as for the uncalibrated values, but provide a narrower 
range of more meaningful PD values.  
 
Table 8. Calibrated Default Probabilities.   
 
The DD, PD, CDD and CPD values have all been calibrated to EDF values as per the discussion preceding the 
table. The CDS spreads are for terms of 5 years on non-subordinated debt as reported by the  Reserve Bank of 
Australia  (RBA 2008; 2009a) and defined by the RBA as being the average spreads of Australian commercial 
banks  and  their  US  and  European  equivalents.  Comparative  Canadian  bank  spreads  are  not  available. 
Correlation between each column and Australian CDS spreads is shown at the bottom of the table. * denotes 
significance at the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. 
 
CDS CDS CDS
Calibrated CalibratedCalibrated Calibrated Spread Spread Spread
DD PD CDD CPD Australia US Europe
2002 2.6 0.54% 1.8 3.44% 15 42 28
2003 2.6 0.45% 1.9 3.15% 12 18 13
2004 2.8 0.26% 1.9 2.65% 10 18 10
2005 3.0 0.16% 2.0 2.38% 9 16 9
2006 2.8 0.22% 1.9 2.79% 7 9 8
2007 2.0 2.31% 1.3 9.85% 48 76 52
2008 1.5 6.58% 1.0 16.26% 145 180 158
r -0.930 0.999 -0.932 0.973
p 0.0024 <0.001 0.0022 0.0002
Significance ** ** ** ** 
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We compare this to Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads for Australian and US banks in the 
last  2  columns of  Table  8. CDS  spreads  are premia  payable for protection against the 
default  of  an  underlying  contract.  These  can  be  traded  without  any  ownership  of  the 
underlying debt, with increases in spreads representing an increase in default probability. 
As  seen  in  the  table,  US  bank  CDS  contracts  typically  trade  at  a  higher  spread  than 
Australian  banks.  We  have  correlated  our  DD,  PD,  CDD  and  CPD  values  with  the 
Australian bank spreads. These correlations all show exceedingly high significance (>99% 
confidence).  Thus, while all the indicators in this paper (bad debts, loss provisions, PD, 
CPD, Calibrated PD, Calibrated CPD, and CDS) show different levels of default according 
to different methodologies used, they all have one thing in common – a significant increase 
in risk in default risk levels is indicated from pre-GFC to GFC. 
 
7.3  Cross-Sectional Analysis 
To ascertain  if there are size / region / individual bank differences in our measurements, 
Appendix 1 splits the banks for all the regions into ‘major’ and ‘other’ banks and provides 
figures on VaR, CVaR, Stdev (asset value fluctuations) and CStdev (worst 5% of asset 
value fluctuations). We have used $40 billion market capitalisation as the cut-off point for 
defining a major bank, as this point ensures all Australian major banks are included as 
major  banks,  and  also  that  all  of  our  regions  have  at  least  3  banks  included  in  the 
comparison. Given the high number of banks (over 4 countries / regions) only the major 
bank figures have been shown at individual level, with the ‘other’ bank figures showing the 
weighted average for those banks. Also, to avoid extensively detailed tables, we have only 
included parametric method for measuring VaR and CVaR in the tables. In summary, the 
figures  show  major  banks  in  Australia  to  have  lower V a R ,  C V a R ,  S t d e v ,  a n d  C S t d e v  
figures than ‘other’ Australian Banks. Both groups have significantly worse figures for all 
these 4 indicators during the GFC as compared to pre-GFC (significant difference at 99% 
confidence level using an F test), however the extent of the increase in tail risk was actually 
larger for the majors (2.14x for CVaR and 1.80x for CStdev) than for ‘other’ (1.66x for 
CVaR and 1.54x for CStdev). The significance of the differential between CStdev for the 
major banks and the ‘other’ banks falls from the 99% level pre-GFC to the 95% level  
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during the GFC period. The following paragraphs elaborate on, and provide reasons for 
these trends.  
 
Table 4 shows that the 5 largest banks (the four majors and St. George) have the 5 lowest 
volatility levels, with St George having the lowest, followed by Westpac, Commonwealth, 
ANZ, then National Australia Bank. The aggregate VaR for the pre GFC majors is 0.0191 
(CVaR 0.0265) as compared to VaR 0.0249 (CVaR 0.0432) for the ‘other’ banks.  
 
Increase in risk indicators is particularly high for ANZ with a 2.41x increase in CVaR and a 
2.12x increase in CStdev. Whilst both NAB ($3.5 bn) and ANZ ($2.47 bn), had higher 
credit impairment charges over 2007 and 2008 than the other major banks, NAB already 
had higher VaR and CVaR figures than the other major banks due to high rogue-trading 
losses and multi-billion dollar write-offs related to their US Homeside business in the pre-
GFC period, and thus ANZ had further to fall than NAB when the GFC problems hit.  
Although  the  ‘other’  banks  have  higher  overall  volatility  than  the  majors  (the  notable 
exception being St. George), the aggregate VaR and CVaR for all banks is not much higher 
than that for the major banks, due the much greater size of the majors. In particular, smaller 
entities  such  as  Homeloans  and  Mortgage  Choice  show m u c h  h i g h e r  v o l a t i l i t y  l e v e l s .  
Macquarie  also  shows  particularly  high  CVaR  levels  during  the  GFC,  having  a  high 
reliance  on  wholesale  and  corporate  markets,  as  well  as  market  reaction  to  news  that 
Macquarie’s  investments  included  exposure  to  sub-prime  mortgages,  although  this  was 
assessed by Standard & Poor’s (2007) to be “less than significant relative to the bank’s 
asset book and earnings”. KPMG (2008) shows bad debts increasing by 64% in 2008 for 
the  Regional  banks (for  whom they  include  St. George,  Bendigo-Adelaide-Rural  Bank, 
Suncorp Metway, and Bank of Queensland), and a low  increase in profits of 4.8%. There 
was  very  low  growth  in  non-interest  income  particularly  due  to  decrease  from  wealth 
management  operations  (in  which  the  regional  banks  have  significant  activity)  and 
significant  falls  in  global  stock  market  operations.  Losses  for  Australian  banks  were 
generally higher for corporate exposures than in consumer markets, and the Regional Banks 
were not as exposed as the majors to the corporate sector. The exception here is Suncorp, 
who although showed VaR and CVAR figures in table 4 for 2007-2008 which were not  
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very different to the ‘other’ banks, they suffered significant credit losses in 2009 due to 
greater exposure to corporates. A 600% increase in credit impairment losses was shown by 
Regional banks in 2008/2009, which is much higher than the increase in impaired assets for 
all  Australian  banks  shown  in  Table  1.  However,  excluding  Suncorp,  the  increase  for 
Regional banks was 191%, which is line with the increase for all Australian banks.   
 
The Australian government financial claims scheme guaranteed deposits of $1 million and 
below for all Australian owned banks, building societies, and credit unions which helped 
improve confidence in the banking sector for major and ‘other’ banks. Deposits over $1 
million were subject to a fee, which varied according to the deposit institution’s credit 
rating. This somewhat disadvantaged the smaller banks whose lower credit rating meant a 
higher fee. AA- (and above)  rated banks paid a fee of 70 basis points per annum, A+ to A- 
100 basis points and BBB+ and below 150 basis points.   Most funds raised under the 
scheme were by the four majors who have AA ratings and other banks who fall in the A+ to 
A- category such as  Macquarie and Suncorp. The remaining ‘other’ banks fall in the BBB+ 
and below category. However, this advantage of the higher rated banks only had a short 
term impact (which in turn would have included only a short term impact on our VaR, 
CVaR and Asset Value measures), with the RBA (2010) reporting that take up was at the 
highest just after introduction of the scheme and as concerns about the global system eased, 
ADIs  were  less  willing  to  absorb  the  fee  and  customers  were  less  willing  to  pay  for 
additional security over what was already perceived to be a relatively low risk investment. 
The wholesale guarantee scheme was predominantly used to guarantee long-term liabilities, 
and after the initial take-up the AA rated banks continued to issue unguaranteed bonds 
rather than issuing guaranteed and paying the extra fee. The RBA reports that whilst there 
continues to be little unguaranteed bond issuance for lower rated deposit institutions, these 
entities have not traditionally been large players in this market.   
 
In all 3 of the comparison regions (Canada, Europe, US), there is also a significant increase 
in  all  risk  measures  shown in  Appendix 1  from  pre-GFC  to  GFC.  Among the  majors, 
Barclays, UBS, Unicredit, Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo stand out as having 
high VaR, CVAR and asset value fluctuations during the GFC. These are all entities which  
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featured prominently in the GFC among those banks which suffered problems such as large 
losses, capital shortages, and substantial writedowns of investments in subprime mortgages. 
Overall,  there  is  no  clear  pattern  emerging  as  to  differences  in  the  risk  measurements 
between  major  and  ‘other’  banks.  In  Canada  ‘other’  banks  have  lower  asset  value 
fluctuations than major banks both pre and during the GFC, but there is no significant 
difference in VaR and CVaR. In Europe ‘other’ banks are more risky than majors on all 
measures with this differential increasing during the GFC. In the US, the increase in all 
measures was fairly similar for majors and ‘other’ banks, with GFC asset value fluctuations 
being similar across both groups. It should be noted of course, that as we are looking at 
asset  value  fluctuations,  our  study  only  includes  listed  groups,  and  (with  the  notable 
exception  of  Lehman  Brothers)  the  large  number  of  financial  institution  failures  are 
predominantly smaller unlisted entities. If we consider all 4 regions as a whole, the large 
increases in our risk measurements are widespread (but to a lesser degree in Canada and 
Australia), across all categories of banks in our study. Larger banks experienced significant 
difficulties such as access to wholesale funding (all regions), writedown of investments in 
sub-prime mortgages (mainly US and Europe), and exposure to corporate loan losses (all 
regions).  Many  smaller  entities  also  had  problems  accessing  funding.  These  entities 
generally also had relatively large exposures to the home loan market which was impacted 
by rising unemployment and falling house prices, particularly in the US and Europe. Many 
of the smaller banks also had large exposures to a falling commercial property market.   
Thus all categories of banks, small and large, experienced problems during the GFC.   
 
7.4  Implications for Capital Adequacy.  
As  discussed  in  Section  1,  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  sees  it  as 
important that adequate capital buffers are held in good times that can be drawn upon in 
periods of stress, and are looking to introduce buffer requirements in Basel III. It was also 
discussed in Section 1 how  a mark to market approach of a bank’s assets can provide a 
measure  of  how  much  capital  needs  to  be  raised  to  restore  confidence  in  a  bank’s 
capitalisation. Let us take the take the BOE example, whereby UK banks held capital (total 
balance sheet equity to total assets) of 3.3% prior to the GFC. We see in Appendix 1 that 
European banks experienced an approximate doubling in asset volatility during the GFC.  
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Let us also assume that this capital position position held by the banks provided a DD 
which was acceptable to regulators in pre-GFC circumstances.   Given that volatility in 
assets is the denominator of the DD equation, in order to restore UK DD to the pre-GFC 
position, capital needs to be doubled in line with the volatility  increase.  This  means  a 
capital buffer of 3.3% (resulting in a total ratio of 6.6%). Applying the same rationale to 
Australian banks, they would require a much lesser increase, as their capital ratio is already 
6.2%. Thus, provided a benchmark DD (and hence PD) is provided by regulators (or banks 
themselves), and increases in asset volatility are modelled during downturns, the extent of 
the capital buffer required can be determined.   
 
8.  Conclusions and Implications 
Despite the lower volatility of Australian banks in comparison with their US and European 
peers, Australian bank default risk still increases dramatically during the GFC when we 
include market asset value fluctuations as compared to the static external ratings. On a CPD 
basis, Australian banks fare only slightly better than the US and UK during the GFC, with 
all 3 of these regions showing extremely high default probabilities.  Banks typically have 
much lower equity levels than other industries, and the combination of this and market 
asset value fluctuations leads to increased default probabilities. 
 
This paper has provided a range of evidence to show that the risk of Australian banks 
deteriorated during the  GFC, in contrast to the static  external  ratings.  Firstly,  although 
impaired assets are much lower than those of global peers, they nonetheless increased five-
fold. Secondly, share prices have been extremely volatile, dropping 58% over the GFC 
period, with highly significant increases in VaR and CVaR. Thirdly, banks show highly 
significant  increases  in default  probabilities on both DD and CDD measures. Fourthly, 
sensitisation of the Merton DD and CDD measures, through calibration to EDF, still results 
in extremely high default probabilities during the GFC. Fifthly, the relative default rankings 
of Australian banks in relation to other industries has deteriorated. Finally, CDS spreads 
have shown a strong increase. 
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This reduction in bank equity values, increase in impaired assets and provisions for bad 
debts, increasing credit default swap spreads, and the shift in relative default rankings of 
banks as compared to other industries, all support the findings of significantly increased 
risk based on market values. In conclusion, contrary to the low static default probabilities 
indicated by external credit ratings, there has been a significant increase in Australian bank 
default  probabilities  during  the  GFC  when  taking  into  account  market  asset  value 
fluctuations.     
 
These findings have implications for lenders to banks in assessing default probabilities and 
regulators  in  determining  capital  adequacy.  The  Basel  standardised  capital  approach  is 
based on external credit ratings, which sees capital requirements in respect of loans to these 
banks remaining static during the GFC as compared to pre-GFC. This is not consistent with 
the increased default probabilities shown in this paper. The findings support including an 
assessment of fluctuating asset values in lending and capital adequacy buffer decisions.  
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ANZ 54,366      0.0192 0.0261 0.0351 0.0630 1.83 2.41 2.25 2.12
COMMONWEALTH 52,468      0.0181 0.0253 0.0308 0.0516 1.71 2.03 1.69 1.47
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA 56,071      0.0205 0.0296 0.0361 0.0587 1.76 1.98 2.07 1.77
WESTPAC 68,424      0.0186 0.0252 0.0327 0.0537 1.76 2.13 2.32 1.85
SUBTOTAL MAJOR BANKS 231,330     0.0191 0.0265 0.0337 0.0566 1.76 2.14 2.10 1.80
OTHER BANKS (10) 33,097      0.0249 0.0432 0.0420 0.0717 1.69 1.66 2.16 1.54
TOTAL 264,427     0.0198 0.0286 0.0347 0.0585 1.75 2.05 2.10 1.76
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:










F 3.1150 4.5588 4.3903 3.2566 1.7079 2.6517 1.2873 1.6077
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **










F 2.8431 2.7578 4.6680 2.3638 1.5588 1.6041 1.3687 1.1669
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0002 0.0425





















BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA 44,523      0.0225 0.0323 0.0366 0.0561 1.63 1.74 1.92 2.26
ROYAL BANK CANADA 74,466      0.0214 0.0317 0.0380 0.0602 1.77 1.90 1.99 2.43
TORONTO-DOMINION 50,852      0.0234 0.0336 0.0362 0.0572 1.54 1.70 1.69 2.10
SUBTOTAL MAJOR BANKS 169,841     0.0223 0.0324 0.0371 0.0582 1.66 1.80 1.87 2.28
OTHER BANKS (6) 60,969      0.0228 0.0330 0.0406 0.0625 1.79 1.90 2.13 2.41
TOTAL 230,810     0.0224 0.0326 0.0380 0.0594 1.70 1.82 1.92 2.30
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:










F 2.7614 3.2253 3.4958 5.1972 1.0409 1.0336 2.6102 2.6706
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.2012 0.2448 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** ** ** - - ** **










F 3.1899 3.5935 4.5301 5.8226 1.2024 1.1516 2.0143 2.3838
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0199 0.0576 <0.0001 <0.0001




































BANCO SANTANDER 121,617     0.0335 0.0482 0.0430 0.0699 1.28 1.45 1.52 1.64
BARCLAYS 48,519      0.0322 0.0473 0.0651 0.1018 2.02 2.15 3.84 4.17
BNP PARIBAS 84,755      0.0313 0.0476 0.0503 0.0812 1.61 1.70 2.68 2.92
CREDIT SUISSE 76,650      0.0393 0.0620 0.0607 0.1006 1.54 1.62 2.08 2.16
HSBC 192,500     0.0241 0.0369 0.0354 0.0588 1.47 1.60 1.68 1.90
LLOYDS TSB 50,130      0.0310 0.0455 0.0617 0.0985 1.99 2.16 3.00 2.93
SOCIETE GENERALE 45,040      0.0350 0.0511 0.0575 0.0873 1.64 1.71 2.49 2.52
UBS 72,326      0.0291 0.0435 0.0658 0.1072 2.26 2.46 3.36 3.64
UNICREDIT 50,240      0.0267 0.0411 0.0544 0.0933 2.03 2.27 3.35 3.88
SUBTOTAL MAJOR BANKS 741,777     0.0303 0.0456 0.0503 0.0818 1.66 1.79 2.05 2.22
OTHER BANKS (7) 153,969     0.0340 0.0523 0.0653 0.1118 1.92 2.14 3.61 3.92
TOTAL 895,746     0.0310 0.0468 0.0529 0.0869 1.71 1.86 2.15 2.34
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:










F 2.7459 3.2146 4.2014 4.9261 1.2582 1.3162 8.5943 7.0611
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **










F 3.6873 4.5682 13.0506 15.3323 1.6896 1.8705 2.7668 2.2686
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001





















BANK OF AMERICA 130,273     0.0268 0.0407 0.0778 0.1326 2.91 3.26 6.04 8.34
CITIGROUP 94,280      0.0306 0.0462 0.0895 0.1566 2.92 3.39 6.04 7.64
JP MORGAN 154,621     0.0361 0.0549 0.0666 0.1075 1.84 1.96 2.09 2.33
US BANCORP 43,062      0.0294 0.0460 0.0479 0.0756 1.63 1.64 1.95 2.09
WELLS FARGO 139,771     0.0213 0.0316 0.0648 0.1019 3.05 3.22 3.28 4.02
SUBTOTAL MAJOR BANKS 562,006     0.0288 0.0437 0.0711 0.1177 2.47 2.69 3.22 3.93
OTHER BANKS (46) 125,900     0.0241 0.0361 0.0638 0.1024 2.65 2.84 3.06 3.59
TOTAL 687,906     0.0279 0.0423 0.0698 0.1149 2.50 2.72 3.19 3.86
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:










F 6.0948 7.2621 10.3795 15.4100 1.4353 1.4624 1.3362 1.1596
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0010
Significance ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **










F 7.0377 8.0475 9.3722 12.8910 1.2430 1.3197 1.2066 1.0308
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0076 0.0010 0.0181 0.3673















VaR is calculated on a parametric basis, whereby the standard deviation of daily returns is multiplied by 1.645 
(being 95% confidence level based on a normal distribution). Annual VaR can be obtained by multiplying Daily 
VaR by the square root of 250. Figures are undiversified and represent the weighted average of the individual bank 
VaRs. CVaR is calculated as the average of the worst 5% of actual returns (those beyond the 95% VaR).  The pre-
GFC category calculates daily VaR for the 2 year window including data from 2007 and 2008.  The GFC category 
calculates daily VaR for the 7 year period from 2000-2006. Major banks for the purposes of this table are defined as 
all banks with market capitalization exceeding USD $40billion. The four columns on the right of the table show the 
increases (GFC as compared to pre-GFC) in VaR, CVaR Asset Stdev and Asset CStdev. Market asset value of 
returns is (Stdev) calculated as the standard deviation of all asset returns for the period, whereas CStdev is based on 
the worst 5% of asset returns. F testing is undertaken to test for variance in volatility. F is 21/ 22, where 1 and 
2 are the standard deviations of returns for the two samples being compared. An F value of 1 shows no difference 
between the samples and a value of 3 shows variance of 3x higher in the one sample as compared to the other. * 
denotes significance at the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. 
 